Volume 40 Number 1
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February 2002 Volume 40 Number 1 |
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Editor's PageThis issue's "Editor's Page" is more complicated than most. It's long; it has three major sections rather than the usual two; and the first of the sections deals with JOE numbers—and I always find numbers complicated. JOE by the NumbersSubmission & Readership Rates 2001 was a banner year for JOE. Authors submitted 212 articles last year, 30 more than in 2000 and 68 more than in 1999. In fact, submissions have increased more than 100% over the last 5 years (114%, to be exact). This means more and more of your colleagues are writing for JOE. More and more people are reading it, too. In 2001, the JOE site had approximately 412,400 "visitors" who viewed 935,208 pages. We're talking increases of 372% and 255%, respectively, since 1998! (JOE is a really good journal, and the Web is growing really—really—fast.) Many of those visitors have been subscribers (3,458), but others are now discovering the wealth of information available at www.joe.org via popular Internet search engines like Yahoo and Google. Editorial Review Rates As you know, JOE now employs a two-tiered review system. As editor, I review each submission to determine whether or not it is suitable to be sent out to our "blind" reviewers. If it isn't, I return the submission to the author with (often substantive) revision suggestions. (See my April 2001 "Editor's Page" http://www.joe.org/joe/2001april/ed1.html for some of the things I look for.) In 2001, I: Rejected ~ 8% of submissions as unsuitable for JOE; Returned ~ 43% to authors for revision; and Accepted ~ 48% as suitable to be sent to reviewers (or, in the case of Commentary and Tools of the Trade articles, suitable for publication). So much for the first tier. "Blind" Review Rates The second tier of the JOE review system involves our wonderful JOE reviewers. (I say "wonderful" based both on my own evaluation of their reviews and on the many complimentary comments I get about them from authors.) Of the 2001 submissions that have been completely through the "blind" review process: ~ 10% have received an average rating of "Use Ideas & Start Over"; ~ 15% have received a rating of "Major Revision Needed"; ~ 42% have received a rating of "Minor Revision Needed"; and ~ 32% have been accepted for publication. The two tiers in the JOE review system add up to a unique combination of academic rigor and professional development. JOE both "keeps the bar high" and helps authors get published. Discussion OpportunityWe had an encouraging (but not overwhelming) response to the JOE Discussion Forum feature that we unveiled in the Commentary articles in the December 2001 JOE. We've made some adjustments to give a bit more prominence to the threaded discussion opportunity in this issue's Commentary article. Please take advantage of the opportunity to enter or start a new discussion with your Extension colleagues on the issues raised in "Extension Faculty and Political Acumen." Is the author suggesting that some Extension administrators don't do enough to prepare their Extension staff to move beyond the realm of providing "objective" and "factual information"? Is he right? Or do you believe it's inappropriate for Extension staff to become involved in public and possibly controversial issues? February 2002 JOESpeaking of Extension and "public and possibly controversial issues," five of the articles in the February JOE address that topic in one way or another. Besides the Commentary, check out the first articles in the Features, Research in Brief, Ideas at Work, and Tools of the Trade categories. Several other articles discuss diversity, the featured topic in last December's JOE. And evaluation receives its share of attention, as do agriculture, natural resources, and a host of other topics. The February 2002 JOE has something for just about everyone. Laura Hoelscher, Editor
Extension Faculty and Political AcumenMichael Stoltz As with most public employees, Oregon State University Extension faculty are not permitted to engage in political activity as part of their official duties. Even so, they are involved in marketing Extension programs, supporting budget requests, and asking Extension clientele and supporters to lobby for resources. How can Extension faculty meet the need for public understanding of Extension programs and the need to build public and decision-maker support without becoming "lobbyists"? How can they be politically active without creating problems for themselves and their organization? With 34 years in Extension, including 30 in county offices, I've learned that there are several ways for Extension faculty to be involved with decision makers/elected officials. I have found that Extension field faculty can be a powerful political tool—if Extension administration will support and use them effectively. However, there are also inappropriate responses and conversations that can cause substantial political harm. InsightsAcross the United States, Extension faculty have appropriately provided factual information to clientele about the importance and impact of programs and asked these clientele to contact legislators for political support of funding. If Extension field faculty have the appropriate information and are comfortable approaching legislators or members of Congress directly about Extension support and budgets, even more support can be gained. Extension administration and field faculty need to understand that effective faculty—highly respected for the job they do—can spearhead change, promote understanding of complex and/or controversial issues, and build political support for Extension. Some of this, especially political support, includes developing personal relationships with elected officials as well as the more common method of working through Extension clientele. The most powerful tools for building political support for Extension are strong programs in the field; funding follows good programming. In order to be effective in the political field, Extension faculty usually must be in their location several years and have developed outstanding programs. Their reputations will precede them as they foster working relationships with elected officials. To take advantage of these relationships, Extension faculty have to know and understand the federal, state, and local budgets and programs. If Extension administration provides them with reliable information in a timely manner, they can share that information with constituents and legislators. The dividends come in the form of increased statewide budgets. Three Examples of Problems and OpportunitiesDiscussing Internal Conflicts in Public or with ClienteleThere are times when Extension faculty have made major political mistakes by discussing internal conflicts or decisions with clientele and decision makers. Not only can this destroy the Extension worker's and the organization's credibility, but it also can have long-ranging consequences. These could be internal conflicts in the local Extension office or they could be national issues. Consider the situation that arose in Congress with the 1990 Federal Extension budget. A number of powerful agricultural organizations were voicing concerns to USDA and individual members of Congress that Extension was shifting money from its agricultural and 4-H roots and, instead, was instituting social programs targeting disadvantaged audiences, the poor, the homeless, children at risk, etc. Federal Extension personnel learned that local farm organizations were getting their information from local Extension workers. In turn, members of the organizations shared this information with their national officers, who took it directly to their congressional representative and to the congressional hearings on Extension's budget. Maintaining base funding in the Federal Extension budget became more difficult because of this input. Two things caused this problem. First, local Extension faculty did not have all the information they needed to be so closely engaged in the situation. Although agriculture and youth funding remained constant and there had been additional funding from grants and the Federal initiative process for specifically targeted programs, Extension faculty did not know or did not report it. Second, the faculty voiced their frustration about this perceived switch in funding priorities to clientele. By sharing misinformation with clientele, the Extension faculty nearly destroyed their support base and severely damaged their credibility. Extension administration from the federal level to the state level must work at providing faculty with reliable budget and policy information, and faculty must understand how important it is to be accurate in conversations with elected officials and clientele. Responsive and Open Approach to ControversyIn another example, at the county and state level, a controversy with potentially negative political outcomes developed, but decisive action by local and state Extension faculty turned the situation around. In the early 1980's, the area around Eugene, Oregon found itself with the largest Gypsy Moth infestation found west of the Mississippi. Aerial application of insecticides could expose more than 100,000 people in the metropolitan and surrounding area. In an area known for its environmental awareness, the Eugene metropolitan area population expressed concern about potential pesticide use. The Oregon Department of Agriculture asked the local OSU Extension forestry faculty member to develop a task force. The faculty member insisted that the environmental community be represented on the task force. Two state Extension faculty in the OSU Department of Agricultural Chemistry offered to conduct a toxicological assessment of the proposed insecticides if requested by the task force. The Extension county staff chair made sure the testing was requested. Two of the four possible insecticides proposed to the task force were rejected based on the assessed risk. Simultaneously, a local Eugene group charged that the local Extension faculty were biased in their presentations, advocating only an insecticide approach to the problem. They sent protest letters to the co-chairs of the Oregon Legislature Ways and Means Committee, which oversees Extension's budget, and to the chair of the Senate Agriculture and Natural Resources Committee, asking for a hearing to enumerate their grievances. The county office staff chair wrote the same legislators and copied the groups involved and also the local county commissioners, the Eugene City Council, local state legislators, and other influential people. The letter outlined Extension's role—including the rejection of two proposed insecticides—and its involvement in the decision to use a new Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) compound that was acceptable to many in the environmental community. The staff chair offered to participate in any legislative meetings to discuss Extension's role in the project and any inappropriate behavior. In return, Extension received a letter of thanks from the chair of the Senate Agriculture and Natural Resources Committee for the information, and there were no additional complaints about Extension's role. Why was this successful? I believe it is because the Extension faculty involved were willing to discuss what had been done correctly, and, if mistakes were made, what was done incorrectly. OSU State Extension faculty took the initiative to develop needed information on a controversial issue, and they and the local faculty provided facts that people could understand and use. Extension field faculty responded directly to legislators and other elected officials with balanced and factual information when another group charged bias. Even though many said the gypsy moth infestation was too large to control, the infestation was eliminated after 4 years by using several integrated control methods, including trapping, inspections, mating disruptions, and Bt. Extension Field Faculty's Key Role in State BudgetMy third example is at the state level. In Oregon, work on Extension's state budget starts 1 year ahead of a legislative session with the Oregon Legislature, meeting every 2 years. Contact with local legislators on issues and budgets by key Extension clientele around the state has worked very well. In addition, several state Extension faculty have worked with specific commodity groups who have championed the budget. Local Extension faculty have worked with local supporters and directly with legislators to complete the grass-roots support for increases in the Extension and research budgets. Based on a legislative investment initiative developed in February and March of 1998 (almost a year before the legislature convened January, 1999), the 1999 legislative session saw a key Oregon senator introduce a bill to increase the budgets of Extension and research by more than 20%. After intense legislative maneuvering, the final budget included an 11% increase for Extension. In the 2001 legislative session, the previous increase was to be cut. The same approach reinstated the full budget. It is important for Extension administration to work with faculty to develop realistic and reliable budget figures and plans well in advance of a legislative session. Oregon Extension distributes updated budget figures and success stories to all field faculty months ahead of the session. When asking for increased resources, everyone must know where the positions will be located and exactly what they will do. It is important for faculty with solid performance records to interact with legislators in their districts, informing them of Extension's impacts. In addition, administration should encourage key state Extension faculty to work with various commodities and other support groups. Extension must have strong programs that earn support from decision makers. Then, when a budget plan is developed and communicated well ahead of time, and faculty have made contact with legislators and support groups, it is possible for Extension to rely on the more traditional approach—that is, sharing information with advisory councils and clientele so they can contact legislators. In Oregon there is a strong expectation from administration that Extension faculty will be actively involved with clientele and elected officials concerning Extension's local, state, and federal budgets. ConclusionExtension administrators have a responsibility in preparing faculty to be effective in the political world. They need to provide the plans and budgets to faculty and provide the resources to learn the skills for successful interaction with elected officials. Communication between levels of Extension becomes critical if faculty are to be effective. There are many pitfalls, but there can be ample rewards in the form of a stable or higher Extension budget. Extension faculty are involved in politics whether they want to be or not. To be effective, faculty need to know their role—and their boundaries. When they err or are challenged, they need to know how to respond. It is often said, "All politics is local." Our Extension motto might be: "All programs are political." Therefore, we need to make sure faculty have the political acumen they—and we—need. View reader comments for this Commentary in the JOE Discussion Forum. (This forum is no longer accepting new entries.)
The Role of Extension in Controversial Studies: The Case of Interstate Dairy CompactsKenneth W. Bailey IntroductionExtension is increasingly being asked to analyze and address controversial issues of importance to their local stakeholders. This is particularly true for Extension economists, who must now conduct applied research that was historically done by their research colleagues. This new trend provides opportunities for Extension to develop well-conceived, research-based economic analysis of critical public policy issues. However, it also carries risks, particularly if Extension is viewed as " biased" or providing skewed results to meet the latest political needs of select local stakeholders. In the spring of 1998 this author, along with other University of Missouri Extension faculty, was requested by a state dairy association to evaluate the economic impact of a policy proposal. The Missouri Governor and state legislators were considering whether or not Missouri should join a controversial Southern Dairy Compact. Regional dairy compacts are designed to enhance local and regional milk prices. By design, they also affect interstate trade in milk and dairy products. To join the Southern Dairy Compact, Missouri had to seek passage of a new state law authorizing the compact, approval by the Governor of Missouri, and ultimately consent of the Congress. The Missouri Director of Agriculture, Mr. John Saunders, was interested in this issue because he was charged with making a recommendation to the Governor regarding support for state legislation that would enable Missouri to join any new compact. After presenting some historical background and citing some literature on Extension involvement in controversial topics, this article reviews the steps taken by the University of Missouri in dealing with a recent very controversial study. While the study did not quell the controversy surrounding the validity of interstate dairy compacts, it did provide various public and private stakeholders in Missouri and beyond with a greater understanding of the economic tradeoffs involved. More important, the process employed by the university maintained the integrity of academic freedom and sound science. Pamphlet Number 5 and the Oleo Margarine WarThe profession of agricultural economics has a long history of dealing with controversial public policy issues, particularly with regard to analysis dealing with the U.S. dairy industry. In 1943, Professor T. W. Shultz, then Head of the Department of Economics at Iowa State University, co-authored a controversial report on the nutritive value of oleo margarine. The report, referred to as Pamphlet No. 5, "Putting Dairying on a Wartime Footing," made the assertion that margarine compared favorably with butter as a source of fat in the diet (Beneke, 1998). This report struck a sensitive nerve with the U.S. dairy industry. At the time they were trying to maintain a two-to-one price advantage for butter over oleo margarine. An indirect impact of the war years was to introduce consumers to a cheaper and more plentiful alternative to butter. Butter sales as a result dropped from 16 pounds per capita before World War II to 10-12 pounds just after the war (Bailey, 1997). During the three decades beginning with the 1950s, butter sales fell and stabilized at just over 4 pounds per capita. Margarine sales, on the other hand, grew from just over 2 pounds per capita before the war to 10-12 pounds per capita by the 1980s. Beneke (1998) reports that the president of the National Dairymen's Association disputed the accuracy of the publication. That put pressure on Iowa State College President Charles Friley to reevaluate the publication. The affair ended with Schultz tendering his resignation during the controversy to Friley "so that our discussions may be as free as possible from any concern about my personal or professional interest as a member of the staff." That one resignation brought to light the fundamental right of faculty members to conduct research free of special groups that have a vested interest in the outcome of university research. Extension's Role in Public PolicyMore recently, Barron (1998) notes that public policy often creates both winners and losers. In this environment, the principles of honesty, respect, and decorum may fall by the wayside. Despite these dangers, Barron suggests that "it is the job of university faculty and administrators to support and seek the truth wherever that path leads." Extension has a unique role in conducting public policy analysis because of our close relationships with stakeholders that are affected by such research. Goodwin (1993) suggests a more limited role for Extension by presenting contrasting viewpoints only. But Schumacher and Lloyd (1997) take a more aggressive stance by stating the role of Extension in public policy education is, "(a) to make highly technical information available to farmers and the public in an understandable form; (b) to provide unbiased information; (c) to help create a forum in which all stakeholders have an opportunity for input; and (d) to provide education for our clientele." Interstate Dairy CompactsLike the oleo margarine study, the subject of interstate dairy compacts is extremely controversial because it has the potential to pit farmers against farmers, farmers against processors, and farmers against consumers. In many cases, lawmakers, both at the state and federal level, are caught in the middle. They are requested to make decisions on a very complicated issue. The economics of dairy compacts, despite the complexities of dairy policy and conflicting statements made in the popular press, is extremely clear. A dairy compact is an agreement among a group of states to regulate the price of milk. The compact receives its authority from the Congress. That authority requires the creation of a Compact Commission to promulgate rules and set milk prices. The Commission attempts to enhance revenue for dairy farmers participating in the compact by fixing fluid milk prices (bottled milk) above existing federal or state prices. The Commission only has authority to regulate fluid milk prices; milk used for manufacturing purposes is not subject to such regulation because it derives its value from a national market. The U.S. Constitution prevents state laws from interfering with the interstate shipment of goods and services. Our founding fathers recognized that if the economy of this country were to grow, goods and services must be freely traded across state lines. Thus one state cannot fix a high milk price for their local dairy farmers and erect barriers to lower priced out-of-state milk. An exception to interstate trade may be found in the Commerce Clause to the U.S. Constitution. That exception allows states to " compact" together if they gain authority from the Congress to do so. Historically speaking, this exception was used over time to deal with border disputes and other administrative matters important to only a few states in the Union. The Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact (Northeast Compact), which expired in September 2001, was a recent example of a compact between six New England states and received its authority from Congress in the 1996 Farm Bill. The language that created the Northeast Compact required that a commission be formed. The Northeast Dairy Compact Commission established regulations and set a fluid milk price (compact price) at $16.94 per hundredweight (cwt) for all milk used for fluid purposes in the compact region. At this level, the compact price was above the minimum federal fluid price for the compact region (called a Class I price). The difference between the compact price and the Class I federal price was called the compact obligation, and was collected each month by the Compact Commission and distributed back to compact farmers net of certain deductions. By setting a minimum wholesale fluid price above the federal northeast price, new dollars were generated. The Compact Commission paid out $105.6 million in payments (net of escrow requirements) to eligible dairy farmers over the period July 1997 April 2000, averaging $0.57 per cwt (Bailey, 2000b). This method of fixing wholesale fluid milk prices acted to stabilize and enhance the fluid portion of a farmer's milk check. The effectiveness of dairy compacts in generating new revenue for dairy farmers is part of the reason why it is so controversial. Small family farmers struggling to remain solvent in a very competitive national market for milk see it as a way to garner more dollars from the marketplace. At issue is how much more will processors and retailers pay for milk under a compact scheme, and how much of that increased cost will be passed on to consumers? In addition, if farmers in compact regions receive additional income, will some of them expand their milk production? That would result in additional supplies of cheese, butter, and nonfat dry milk, depressing farm-gate milk prices for farmers in non-compact regions. Hence some farmers are helped and others are hurt. Steps Taken in the Missouri StudyA study on the economics of dairy compacts was undertaken at the University of Missouri. The study, later called the "Missouri Study," used a team approach to determine the scope of the project, identify an acceptable methodology, and complete the study. The following steps were developed for completing the study:
The purpose of the study committee was to provide input and guidance on the study objectives, scope of the project, methodology, and write up. The study team was comprised of experts in the field of milk marketing. They included the author, economists from the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI), economists from USDA (Market Administrator), and representatives from two local dairy cooperatives and the Missouri Dairy Association (MDA). The basic questions the study attempted to answer were:
The major conclusion from the study committee was that the compact study could not be limited to just Missouri. In other words, in order to address the objectives of the study, a national approach would have to be taken, along with regional and state impacts. That's because prices for dairy commodities, such as butter, cheese, and nonfat dry milk, are determined on a national market. And such an approach would show the impact of regional dairy compacts on dairy producers outside the compact. The study committee also suggested that the study take into consideration the impact of dairy compacts on other constituents, namely consumers. Needless to say, some of the committee members did not agree on a national approach. Some stakeholders stated that they requested a study focused on just Missouri dairy farmers. They expressed concern that the study would unnecessarily reveal the economic tradeoffs of dairy compacts on alternative constituents, particularly consumers. They reasoned this could affect Congresses decision to provide authority for a new compact. Despite some disagreement on the scope of the study, it was completed after careful consideration of input from each member of the study committee. The results were then transmitted to Mr. John Saunders via Dr. Ronald Turner, Executive Vice President and Director of Cooperative Extension at the University of Missouri (Turner, 1999). A presentation of the study results was then made to Mr. John Saunders, invited members of his staff, and individuals from the MDA and the Missouri Farm Bureau. Results of the Missouri StudyThe study identified two distinct regions: compact regions and non-compact regions. The study assumed the creation of three compacts (Northeast, Appalachian, and Southeast) that comprised almost 30 percent of the nation's milk supply. The results show that dairy farmers within the dairy compact regions received a higher farm price due to the compact. These farmers reacted by expanding milk production and the volume of milk they sold. Consumers paid more for fluid milk because the compact increased the cost of milk to processors, who passed on their higher costs. Higher retail milk prices reduced fluid milk consumption slightly. Overall spending by consumers on fluid milk in the compact region increased. Greater milk production and less fluid milk consumption in the compact regions resulted in more milk used for manufacturing purposes. That resulted in increased production and lower prices of butter, nonfat dry milk, and cheese in compact regions. That lowered farm prices in the non-compact regions. Farmers in non-compact regions and states responded by producing less milk. The study found that for Missouri consumers, the price of bottled milk would go up by 15 to 31 cents per gallon. Therefore, a family of four would spend an added 41 cents to 84 cents per week under the dairy compact. Total added fluid-milk costs to Missouri consumers would be $13.4 to $26.8 million per year. One reviewer at the presentation of the study results noted that the added cost of the compact to consumers was modest compared to the significantly higher returns to small to moderate size Missouri dairy farmers. The report was released January 1999 (Bailey & Gamboa) and was immediately criticized by compact advocates. Much of the criticism was that the assumptions were not realistic and the results did not meet a priori expectations. For example, the study assumed that the regional dairy compacts would result in a $2 per cwt increase in the price of milk to fluid milk processors. This assumption was based on data from the first 6 months of operation of the Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact. Despite the source of data, the criticism was that this premium associated with the compact was too high. A second criticism was that the impact of the compact on consumers was overstated. Some proponents even suggested that processors would, over time, absorb most of the cost of the compact and that consumers would face little change in retail milk prices. It seems that despite the careful steps taken to form a study committee and to seek input, controversy surrounding this very emotional issue remained. The results of the Missouri study were later submitted for publication to the Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics Review. The study was peer reviewed, accepted for publication (Bailey 2000a), and later received the 2001 Journal Article of the Year award by the Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association. Lessons LearnedThe author accepted a tenure track position at the Pennsylvania State University in dairy marketing and policy. Within 12 months of accepting this job he was asked by a group of Pennsylvania dairy farmers to analyze the economic consequences of the Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact. Their concern was twofold. First, they concluded that the "Missouri Study" was biased. Second, they requested a study of an actual compact (the Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact), rather than a theoretical or stylized version in the "Missouri Study." Clearly, this was a very reasonable request, and it was the responsibility of Extension to address these critical issues. The lessons learned from the Missouri experience helped with the new study (Bailey 2000b). More and more, Extension is being asked to conduct applied economic studies of controversial public policy issues. Extension personnel often have a much more detailed understanding of the complex issues facing their constituents than their research colleagues, who are increasingly focused on more basic research. If Extension is to remain relevant to society, it must be willing to step forward and address these complex and politically sensitive issues. However, care must be taken to conduct these studies in an objective and scholarly manner without unnecessarily alienating affected stakeholders. Care must be taken to address the impact on all stakeholders in society, not just traditional stakeholders. University administrators must be forewarned about such controversial studies. And a study committee or review team made up of respected analysts from outside the university community could be helpful. Finally, affected stakeholders should be carefully briefed on the study results before they are widely disseminated. The process outlined in this study provides guidance to Extension faculty in conducting applied studies of controversial public policy issues. Clearly, Extension cannot and should not avoid addressing important public policy issues. Academic freedom and integrity must be maintained during the process. Extension faculty cannot allow themselves to be placed in a position to be influenced by affected stakeholders. At the same time, Extension cannot operate effectively if they are unnecessarily alienated from important stakeholders. This study outlines an acceptable balance. ReferencesBailey, K. (2000a). Evaluating the economic impacts of regional milk pricing authorities: The case of dairy compacts." Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, 29(2): 208-219. Bailey, K. (2000b). Report on the operation and performance of the Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact. Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology. The Pennsylvania State University [On-line]. Available at: http://dairyoutlook.aers.psu.edu/reports/NECompactStudy.htm Bailey, K. (1997). Marketing and pricing of milk and dairy products in the United States. Ames: Iowa State University Press. Bailey, K., & Gamboa, J. (1999). A regional economic analysis of dairy compacts: Implications for Missouri dairy producers. Report #CA 160. Commercial Agriculture Program, University of Missouri. January 1999 [On-line]. Available at: http://agebb.missouri.edu/commag/dairy/bailey/compact/indexanl.htm Barron, J. C. (1998). The university and controversial research. Choices. Second Quarter, pp. 9-12. Beneke, R. (1998). T.W. Schultz and Pamphlet No. 5: The Oleo Margarine War and academic freedom. Choices. Second Quarter, pp. 4-8. Goodwin, J. (1993) Contrasting viewpoints about controversial issues. Journal of Extension [Online]. 31(3). Available at: http://www.joe.org/joe/1993fall/a7.html Schumacher, S. D. & Lloyd, M. (1997). Educating with controversial issues. Journal of Extension [Online]. 35(1). Available at: http://www.joe.org/joe/1997february/tt2.html Turner, R. J. (1999). Letter of transmittal to Director John Saunders, Missouri Department of Agriculture [On-line]. Available at: http://agebb.missouri.edu/commag/dairy/bailey/compact/turner.htm
Coalition Sustainability: Long-Term Successes & Lessons LearnedKathleen Lodl Georgia Stevens University of Nebraska-Lincoln IntroductionProgram sustainability is a key component of any successful project. Projects that introduce a new endeavor and have high visibility for a short period but fail to be sustainable after the initial thrust create a sense of resentment for local communities. Communities have become wary of participating in yet another opportunity that may be short lived. This can be especially true for grant-funded projects that have a definite timeline. Because of this, many programs require grantees to document sustainability beyond the life of funding. Project sustainability is a commendable goal, but it can be a very difficult part of the project. Project sustainability was a major component of USDA youth-at-risk grants developed in the early 1990's. One of these USDA youth-at-risk projects was designed to develop local-level coalitions to address the needs of youth-at-risk in a rural midwestern state. This article describes the impact several of these coalitions are still making, 10 years after the onset of the initial project and 5 years after cessation of grant funding. The lessons learned through the work of these coalitions can provide insight into the planning and implementation of other projects and provide strategies that can be used to help ensure project sustainability. Review of the LiteratureVery little research has been done on the impact of community coalitions that have continued to work after initial funding has ceased. Public health professionals have been particularly vocal about the lack of research that has been conducted on the institutionalization of community action projects (Holder & Moore, 2000; Altman, 1995). Within Cooperative Extension, the 11 public policy education projects funded by W. K. Kellogg Foundation in the early 1990's provided an insightful lesson as to what sustainability really means. According to their report on lessons learned from these successful projects, those coalitions most likely to be sustained after the initial life of the project are ones that created project materials and developed new organizational legacies (i.e., changes in organizational structure, changes in how the work is done, and changes in prioritization of program implementation) (Hahn, Greene, & Waterman, 1994). Research related to community collaboration projects provides limited discussion of the merits of coalition sustainability. As a teaching tool for Cooperative Extension, a collaboration framework outlining the contextual and process factors that are inherent within collaborations was created, with sustainability listed as one of the process factors needed for building effective relationships that last (Bergstrom et al., 1995). Stevens and Marin-Hernandez (1999) highlight one community collaborative problem-solving lesson learned with a warning that processes isolated from local realities will not be sustained. In earlier research with the same Midwestern project, the federal expectation to sustain the program differed drastically from the local level desire to successfully complete an initial project and not worry about long-term sustainability (Stevens, Lodl, Rockwell, & Burkhart-Kriesel, 1994). With these thoughts in mind, the purpose of this article is to assess the sustainability of community coalitions 10 years after their initial onset and 5 years after funding ceased. Project DescriptionKIDS' TEAM was a 5-year project of the University of Nebraska Cooperative Extension, funded by a grant from the CSREES. The goal of the project was to empower local communities to form coalitions that address the needs of youth and families at risk. Through KIDS' TEAM, 56 community coalitions were developed in Nebraska's rural Third Congressional District. Each of these coalitions initially identified school-age child care as a high priority. To address this issue, KIDS' TEAM developed a program wherein volunteers planned and implemented positive group activities and supervision for school-age youth on school-release days, and as part of a before- and after-school program. Based on coalition successes with school-age child care programs, many went on to address more complex issues. For example, several coalitions developed parenting education programs. Others worked in the area of farm safety. Still others worked with tobacco and alcohol issues faced by teens. While the successes of these coalitions were documented during the term of the project, in order to truly measure the impact of KIDS' TEAM, one must look at the long-term systemic change that transpired and the kinds of outcomes that are still occurring as a result of the project. While those coalitions associated with KIDS' TEAM had the advantages of being part of a statewide effort that had general goals and could provide seed money for the beginning of projects, their experiences can be used as ways to help better the process for other groups that are striving to do the same kinds of grass roots work MethodologyIn order to measure the long-term impact of KIDS' TEAM, individuals who participated on the original KIDS' TEAM leadership team were contacted during spring, 2000, 5 years after the end of funding and 10 years after the beginning of the project. To begin the process, these individuals were asked about the current status of their coalition, the long-term impact from the coalition, and effective processes the coalition had used to reach its goals. Based on the responses from this focus group, the literature was reviewed to determine whether there was a connection between these themes and the previous research. The survey questions were developed based on these responses and further consultation with experts in the field. Leadership team members were reached via telephone and were asked to participate in a telephone interview. Nine individuals participated in the interviews, and information was gathered on 18 coalitions. Some of the interview participants had been involved with more than one coalition site. Through the phone interviews, participants were asked if the coalitions that they had originally been working with were still active or if the coalitions had ceased. At this point in the interview, the participants were asked a series of open-ended questions. Those who responded that a coalition still existed were asked to discuss the current activity of the coalition, the impacts that the coalition has had on the community, the benefits of the coalition's activities, and reasons for success. Themes generated from these interviews were analyzed and compared with the literature. The following is a summary of the results of these interviews. ResultsCurrent Coalition ActivitiesOf those coalitions studied, the focus of most coalitions has expanded beyond the original goal of meeting the needs of children and families on school-release days. Only one group is still focused on this original goal. One coalition closely resembles what was originally established through the KIDS' TEAM program. This group is led by members of the Family, Career and Community Leaders of America (FCCLA) at the local high school and adult volunteers from the community. The youth volunteers provide activities for children in the community on school-release days. These days include teacher work days, fall and spring breaks, and parent-teacher conferences. Another coalition, the Family Resource Organization, exists to help minimize duplication of services among member agencies and organizations. The coalition explores new and different ideas and how they can be implemented in the county. The Family Resource Organization endorses activities that the member agencies conduct. The group has an office and a paid employee to oversee the activities of the group. If the group has an idea for a particular activity, the coordinator works with member agencies to find a sponsor for the event. The Area Family Resource Network is another active coalition. This group recently printed the fourth edition of a directory of services for families in that particular county. The directories are distributed through the school system and member agencies. The group worked to establish a home-based head start program that employs three family educators. The Network has received recognition for the work that has been done to meet the needs of children and families in the area. The group has also worked to distribute information and conduct programs that address a variety of topics including child care, parenting, child abuse, and divorce. The coalition works to collaborate on meeting the needs of children and families in the county to maximize services without duplication. In another community, the FAST Coalition sponsors a number of local programs in the community, such as an adult/youth mentor program. The FAST coalition has worked with the local court system to provide a divorce education program. The group is working with a behavioral services agency to pilot test a federal program that assists families in getting services from the community. The coalition also helps parents develop positive parenting and child care skills. Another coalition has conducted two needs assessment studies over 4 years to identify training needs of educators and child care providers. As a result, the coalition has provided training programs in several areas, such as first aid, information on the basic development of children, and parenting education. The coalition has also conducted a needs assessment with local businesses to identify child care needs. As a result of this work, a new child care facility is being built. A mentor program has been established that pairs an experienced child care provider with a new provider to help facilitate positive care practices. The coalition coordinates the publication and distribution of a bimonthly newsletter that reaches 240 child care providers in the area. The coalition also sponsors mini-grants that are used to fund an annual early childhood education conference. The group also sponsor a Kids' Festival during the community's annual summer celebration. Why Some Have SurvivedWhile each of the functioning coalitions is carrying out programs specific to the local needs of their community, there are some common themes that help describe why they are still thriving. For example, most of the active coalitions have received outside funding over the past 5 years. This funding was cited as a key to success of the active coalitions. Three of the five active coalitions in this study were able to hire and support a paid coordinator through the grant funding received. All indicated that this played a big role in the success of the coalition. When asked to share the impact of their coalition on the community, several similarities emerged for all of the coalitions. Following is a brief listing of the ideas shared:
Finally, the subjects were asked to think about why the coalition has been successful. Several factors were identified. Though not all factors seemed to play a role in the success of each of the coalitions, the following factors seemed to be key to a successful coalition.
The KIDS' TEAM program appears to have helped to lay the early foundation for successful coalitions in these five communities. In general, the resources originally developed by the KIDS' TEAM project are being utilized in the work of the coalitions. For example, the curriculum box developed by the project and information concerning the needs of youth and families continue to be well received. One interview subject shared that organizations in her community had begun talking about forming a group and working together and that KIDS' TEAM acted as a catalyst to get them organized and functioning. Each coalition is unique and works to meet the specific needs in their area. The individuals communicated the value of the collaboration among organizations and agencies. By working together, the coalition has been able to maximize services for children and families and raise awareness in the community of these services. Unfortunately, some of the original coalitions have ceased. The subjects who answered that a coalition had discontinued were asked to share ideas for why this happened. One reason was that funding ran out, making it difficult to continue. Several coalitions relied on volunteer leadership, and burn-out played a role in the demise of the organized activity. In some cases, there was a lack of interest from the community and the activities were not well attended. These factors played a role in the discontinuation of the programs. In most cases, the individuals indicated that KIDS' TEAM had been worthwhile in their communities. The original work of KIDS' TEAM helped to raise awareness of the current needs of children and families. The early coalition building helped to open the lines of communication and foster relationships among organizations that still exist even if the coalition does not. The resources and materials from the KIDS' TEAM program continue to be utilized with other programs through Cooperative Extension, child care, and education. To summarize, KIDS' TEAM appears to have been successful at building and sustaining community coalitions. Five years after completion of the project, project participants were able to talk about the benefits of the program. Whether the coalitions are still active or not, the subjects shared positive feedback. KIDS' TEAM appears to have raised an awareness of current issues of children and families. The program helped to facilitate relationship building among organizations with a common goal to serve families. The active coalitions continue to serve families in Nebraska and appear to be a valuable asset in their communities. Lessons LearnedWhile it is good to know that KIDS' TEAM was successful, it is even more important to understand the KIDS' TEAM coalition building process so that it can be applied to other projects. Based on observations of those coalitions that have successfully sustained themselves and long-term study of a variety of coalition success and failures, the following lessons can be learned.
While many of these lessons appear to be common sense, using them as guidelines when working with coalitions can help to build more permanence into groups that might otherwise meet for a specific purpose and then disband. The lessons learned through the KIDS' TEAM process mirror and expand upon those identified by the Kellogg evaluation report (Hahn, Greene, & Waterman, 1994). With the insight gleaned from these two projects, and others like it, future coalition development can be expedited and enhanced in such a way that grass roots efforts truly can be successful. Acknowledgment Special appreciation is extended to Kyla Olson, project assistant, for her work in collecting information. ReferencesAltman, D. G. (1995). Sustaining interventions in community systems: On the relationship between researchers and communities. Health Psychology, 14(6), 526-536. Bergstrom, A., Clark, R., Hogue, T., Perkins, D., Slinski, M., Iyechad, T., Miller, J., Mullen, S., Rowe, E., Russell, J., Simon-Brown, V., Snider, B. A., & Thurston, F. (1995). Collaboration framework: Addressing community capacity. National Network for Collaboration, Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Services, U.S. Department of Agriculture: Washington, DC. Hahn, A. J., Greene, J. C., & Waterman, C. (1994). Educating about public issues: Lessons from eleven innovative public policy education projects. Media Services at Cornell University: Ithaca, NY. Holder, H. D., & Moore, R.S. (2000). Institutionalization of community action projects to reduce alcohol-use related problems: Systematic facilitators. Substance Use and Misuse, 35(1-2), 75-86. Stevens, G. L., Lodl, K. A., Rockwell, S. K., & Burkhart-Kriesel, C. (1994). Do local realities clash with federal expectations? A case study of youth-at-risk funding. Journal of Extension. [On-line], 32(3). Available at: http://www.joe.org/joe/1994october/a2.html Stevens, G. L., & Marin-Hernandez, A. (1999). Community collaborative problem solving cross-cultural lessons. Journal of Family and Consumer Sciences. 91(2), 79-82.
Evaluating Extension-Based Water Resource Outreach Programs: Are We Meeting the Challenge?Robin Shepard IntroductionThe demand for effective and efficient programs has always been part of Extension-based outreach, but the degree of emphasis placed on accountability is at an all-time high. Greater diversity in programs, concerns over duplication of efforts, calls for the use of communication campaign-type strategies by Extension educators, and more reliance on competitive sources of funds are a few reasons driving the need for program evaluation (Van den Ban & Hawkins, 1996). Furthermore, increased pressures from politicians and agency personnel through program reviews and audits, as well as the federal enactment of the Government Performance and Results Act in 1993 are direct examples of new, expanded attention on program impacts. Beyond the issues of accountability raised by funders and politicians, evaluation must be seen as a fundamental part of being a professional educator (Scarborough, Killough, Johnson, & Farrington, 1997). Outreach program managers and staff must ask the basic questions, "Did we accomplish what we intended?" and "How do we know?" This is the essence of evaluation for today's educator. Evaluation involves a systematic collection of information about the activities, characteristics, and outcomes of programs, personnel, and products, in order to reduce uncertainties, improve effectiveness, and make decisions with regard to what those programs or products are doing and affecting (Patton, 1982). It compares evidence with previously selected criteria to assess the value of a program, activity, or product. Evaluation should be thought of as different from impact reporting. Evaluation requires a well-planned strategy for collecting a variety of outcome data and measuring it against the program's intent (Bennett & Rockwell, 1995). Some of the data can be linked in causal ways to the program, and some cannot. Impact reporting focuses on specific program results, and the data may be narrowly linked only to the impacts program stakeholders deem important (Patton, 1997; Bickman, 1985; and Cronbach, 1982). Ironically, recent trends emphasizing accountability have increased attention on impact reporting, somewhat at the expense of more objective and thorough program evaluation approaches. One reason is that program staff often focus heavily on program implementation until the program or project is over, when they finally turn their attention to impact reporting of project successes (Decker & Yerka, 1990). All too often in outreach education, evaluations are "reactive" in that they are relegated to the last days of a project. Reactive evaluation, in this sense, involves leaving whatever is left in staff time and financial resources to fulfill final reporting obligations and record any impacts that might reflect accomplishments. Background and Supporting InformationIn 1990, then President George Bush recommended a new initiative for enhancing water quality. The President's Water Quality Initiative (WQI) was created as a cooperative effort among the Cooperative State Research Education and Extension Service (CSREES), the Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS), and the Farm Service Agency (FSA). The effort was coordinated with related activities of other United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) agencies, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and agencies of the Department of Interior and Commerce. The WQI stressed integration of projects, data, and information across agency lines, setting the stage for the sharing of program resources and, subsequently, evaluation efforts. The WQI involved Demonstration (DEMO) Projects and Hydrologic Unit Area (HUA) projects, which were designed to encourage producers to adopt specific management practices to protect and/or enhance water quality. DEMOs and HUAs were initiated between 1989 and 1991. In 1997, these projects began phasing out and were required to conduct final reporting and project evaluation. By 2000, many of the projects had ended, and evaluation efforts associated with final reporting came to the forefront. To better understand the evaluation practices of these special water resource outreach efforts, a survey of Extension Service water quality coordinators was conducted. These water quality coordinators do not represent overall evaluation efforts by Cooperative Extension, but they were selected to assess the evaluation efforts of special water quality projects they were required to report and evaluate. This is a situation where a specific group of decision makers was expected to give evaluation greater attention than is usual in general extension-based outreach. This assessment was led by the University of Wisconsin in consultation with national program leaders in both CSREES and NRCS. Objectives of the StudyAs the Water Quality Initiative (WQI) projects began reaching their termination dates between 1997 and 2000, the need for program evaluation grew. In order to encourage and support state-level evaluation of DEMO and HUA projects, the University of Wisconsin conducted an assessment of the intentions each state Extension service had toward evaluating their respective projects. This assessment was developed to determine the methodological approaches to evaluation by CSREES state water quality coordinators. The study objectives included:
Results from this study were used to develop USDA-CSREES and USDA-NRCS guidance pertaining to evaluation and final reporting for DEMO and HUA projects. Subsequent documents were written and distributed nationally in 1998-1999 (Shepard, 1998). Furthermore, the findings from the study have been used, in part, to develop a national evaluation training program by the University of Wisconsin called "Providing Leadership to Program Evaluation." This professional development seminar has been held annually since 1999. MethodologyA list of potential respondents was generated from a national directory of the 48 CSREES state water quality coordinators. These individuals had some level of administrative responsibility for one or more USDA Demonstration (DEMO) or Hydrologic Unit Area (HUA) projects in their states or territories. State water quality coordinators were also the people most likely to know about evaluation plans and expectations for the projects in their states. They were, in effect, in the administrative position most likely to promote, or even design, the evaluation efforts for the projects. Wisconsin's state coordinator was eliminated from this list because the principal investigator/author of the study was the lead contact. In addition, three other coordinators were eliminated from the list because their projects were either led exclusively by NRCS (non-Extension Service) or had already shut down and staff had been reassigned. This left a total of 44 as the maximum number of water quality coordinators for this study. In winter 1997-98, a survey was conducted with the 44 water quality coordinators (i.e., a census of the population of water quality coordinators working with DEMO and HUA projects). The survey was administered using telephone, FAX, and e-mail procedures. An initial telephone call introduced the survey and its purpose to prospective respondents. A screening question gave the coordinator the option of either participating or deferring to a staff member who had been more involved in project evaluation or impact reporting. After agreeing to participate, the respondent was given the choice of receiving the survey questions by e-mail or FAX. Results are based on 31 responses (a 70% response rate). A single interviewer handled the logistics of the survey (initial telephone screen, survey distribution by FAX or e-mail, and follow-up telephone calls in cases where the surveys were not returned). The interviewer indicated that of the 13 states (30%) where the coordinators chose not to participate, most refusals reflected limited concern for evaluation. In checking for non-response bias, those non-respondents stated they felt they would either address evaluation issues at a later date or were not planning any evaluation efforts. When a respondent indicated that they were responsible for multiple projects in a state, the respondent was asked to answer the questions pertaining only to the DEMO project. This was the case in approximately 12 states where both an HUA and a DEMO existed. If the respondent had responsibility for more than one HUA or DEMO, he/she was asked to consider the project that was most concerned with evaluation and impact reporting. The survey involved approximately 35 questions, with the total number per respondent varying depending upon how they followed tiered response categories and/or skip patterns. Questions focused primarily on five areas:
Results and DiscussionThe analysis of results is based on completed interviews with 31 of 44 state water quality coordinators (i.e., the population of state water quality coordinators or their designee who had responsibility for DEMO or HUA evaluation was 44). Furthermore, because the respondents represent a census, based on one contact per state, statistical tests of such measures as probability estimates are not used. Most water quality coordinators indicated that a detailed evaluation strategy for their project had not been developed despite being 1 to 2 years from project closure/termination. Only 8 of 31 (26%) respondents said they were able to assess actual change over time in the adoption of best management practices (BMPs). Such results indicate a lack of pre-planning and commitment to collecting pre-project data with the expectation that specific indicators will be tracked. By default, this leaves most projects with the prospects of conducting reactive forms of evaluation and measurement that are designed to show or even prove certain changes have occurred. A risk in reactive evaluation is that the methods and approach become focused on recording those changes that are most likely to reflect positively on the project. Reactive evaluation can lead to induced bias and a focus on the accomplishments of the project, rather than an objective assessment of what the project intended to do and if it accomplished its goals. This consequence of post-project, or reactive evaluation is affirmed by the water quality coordinators' concern about the lack of baseline information and true assessment of pre-project conditions (Table 1). Table 1
Reactive evaluation and a specific approach to impact reporting are often relied upon in the absence of more planned formative evaluations. Formative uses for evaluation (Scriven, 1967) include issues such as audience needs, current knowledge gaps, prevalent behaviors, and information preferences, etc. When assessed prior to a project's start, these issues can be used to influence the design and implementation of the outreach efforts (King & Rollins, 1999; Lanyon, 1994; Mattocks & Steele, 1994). When tracked over time, such measures can show whether changes have occurred. In this way, evaluation becomes an essential component to initial program design and is integrated into the project from the very beginning. One barrier associated with formative evaluation approaches is deciding what to measure. Water quality projects are by their nature directed at protecting and/or enhancing water quality. This encourages program staff to focus on biophysical changes to the water as an indicator of program success or lack of success. While the overall, or long-term intent, of outreach education may be to protect or enhance water quality, there are other impacts that can be assessed, such as the application of knowledge and skills or the adoption of improved management practices (Rogers, 1995). Such practices are at the heart of most outreach programs, because staff promote certain actions that research has shown to be beneficial to protecting water quality and/or farm profits. Therefore, both long-term indicators of impact (i.e., physical changes to water quality) and more immediate impacts (i.e., changes in farm management and behavior) were assessed by this study to determine the needed level and type of evaluation support for and from state water quality coordinators. The study found that only three (10%) of the states actually conducted a formative assessment strategy for their project. This involved collecting pre-project needs and audience characteristics specifically for DEMO or HUA efforts. However, when all coordinators were asked what information they intended to use to determine program impact, there was reliance upon information ranging from biophysical environmental indicators (e.g., sediment loading, biotic indexes, etc.) to behavioral indicators (e.g., awareness, knowledge, and/or adoption of practices, etc.). When a range of potential indicators were assessed for intended use, many states intended to rely on such indicators without any true baseline from which change could be adequately assessed (Table 2). Table 2.
Building evaluation skills and developing personal confidence to use those skills is critical for educators to answer questions about the effectiveness and efficiency of their programs. It may not be necessary for educators to become evaluation experts; however, they do need a fundamental understanding of methods and ethical standards if they are to make evaluation part of overall program design. This assessment of state water quality coordinators asked several questions pertaining to the training and professional development needs of project staff. In the majority of states, more training was viewed as beneficial to building internal capacity necessary for making evaluation a more common part of projects and outreach programming (Table 3). Specifically, water quality coordinators felt staff needed:
A common concern expressed by water quality coordinators in open-ended responses was that project staff are more likely to have technical and physical science backgrounds (e.g., agronomy, soil science, crop production, etc.) and may not be prepared for or feel comfortable using social science measures (e.g., behavior change, practice adoption, perceptional indices, etc.). Capacity building through training and professional development should consider more than just describing what to evaluate or track (Seevers, Graham, Gamon & Conklin, 1997). In particular, training should address the appropriateness and ethical issues associated with social science data collection through the use of surveys, case study techniques, focus group, and other efforts. Table 3.
Administrative support considerations may also affect evaluation efforts for water resource projects entering their latent stages of activity. An overwhelming concern for water quality coordinators was that as the DEMO and HUA projects reached the end of their federal funding, project staff began leaving or were reassigned to other projects, thus leaving no one to conduct or help in the evaluation efforts. As of 1998, most of the 31 states surveyed indicated they were seeking staff time and funding for evaluation. Seventeen of the states indicated that less than one-half of one staff person's annual work time would be dedicated to evaluation. Twelve of the states expected to spend $15,000 or less on evaluating their DEMO and HUA projects. Of the more committed states, one had planned to dedicate 2.2 annual staff positions to evaluation work, while two states planned to spend nearly all of their final year's project dollars on evaluation. Conclusions and ImplicationsResults from this study indicate an overwhelming lack of attention to project evaluation in special water quality outreach efforts. Indeed, the outright refusal of 30% of the states with DEMO or HUA projects to participate in the survey illustrates the low priority often given to evaluation efforts, especially in light of the most common reasons given for that refusal:
The survey results point to these main explanations and conclusions. Despite the best intentions, the approach to DEMO and HUA project evaluation seemed to be primarily reactive, using neither basic evaluation planning nor formative research techniques. Much attention goes into just "doing" outreach, and by the time evaluation is considered, outreach-focused staff and faculty have moved on to the next outreach program. Without early attention to program evaluation as part of program design and implementation, adequate indicators of potential change are not collected from which a later comparison can be made. Those who conduct and administer water quality outreach programs view evaluation as important; however, barriers to conducting evaluation must be addressed. These barriers include: dedicating time for evaluation beyond that allowed for conducting programs, assigning staff and funding, and recognizing quality evaluation efforts. There is a need to improve staff skills and capacity to conduct evaluations. The training and professional development most requested includes how to evaluate changes in the biophysical environment, agronomic impacts of water quality practices, and the extent to which farmers adopt water quality practices. Training should give specific attention to social science data collection techniques and methods. This requires more than merely a survey methods course, and should include topics such as: a description of various methods and when to use them, how to ensure credibility and confidence, and ethical issues in evolution research. Scientific inquiry and the need to better understand why things occur as they do are part of the culture from which the nation's Land-Grant institutions are founded. However, anecdotal comments from the telephone survey strongly suggest that program evaluation is not given the same status as other aspects of the project, such as program implementation or even applied research efforts. Even more problematic is the apparent lack of support for specific approaches such as formative evaluation as part of program planning. University administrators, program leaders, and even project managers often claim to place a high priority on evaluation, but when it comes to allocating resources and rewarding faculty and staff for quality evaluation work, the commitment is often lacking. There is an administrative hesitation to dedicating staff time and expertise, and especially financial resources, to evaluation. This is supported by the overwhelming absence of baseline information collected prior to, or even in the early stages of, DEMO and HUA projects. Administrators and project staff should acknowledge and support evaluation in substantial ways. Such acknowledgement should include at a minimum:
These actions are necessary to establish an organizational culture that recognizes evaluation as part of the educator's job—not merely an add-on task to be done if and when there is time. Without a shift in our support for evaluation, it will always be considered a nuisance requirement | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
